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1 A Developmental State in Palestine?
From the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994, until the second
intifada and the reoccupation of most of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2001, Palestine was
undergoing a state formation process. Although the Palestinians were only in partial control of
the occupied territories and despite the fact that the territories’ international status remained
unsettled and contested, a Palestinian state apparatus was established. Based primarily on the
Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), this quasi-state established a presidency, a number
of ministries and other executive and administrative bodies, an elected parliament (the
Palestinian Legislative Council, PLC), and a judiciary branch.
The state formation process came, however, to an almost complete halt with the collapse of
the Camp David talks and the onset of the second intifada late 2000 and definitely with the
Israeli reoccupation of most of the West bank and Gaza in 2002. At the time of writing,
Palestine is divided into eight zones, with 120 checkpoints and 220 enclaves, a wall is being
built, the economy is in ruins and the Palestinian National Authority hardly operates.
A severe political predicament nevertheless faced the Palestinians - in addition to the
unresolved question of statehood, lack of physical control of the territory, and economic
subjugation to Israel - namely the character of the state that was being formed. The emerging
Palestinian entity was not democratic, transparent or accountable, and its legitimacy was
contested. Moreover, the rule system and the state institutions developed certain institutional
and decision-making characteristics that pointed in the direction of a strong developmental
state, albeit with many countervailing characteristics.
The new ruling elite emanated basically from the “extra-territorial” PLO with its proper
interests, political agenda and internal cohesion. From having a distinctly socialist political
agenda originally, the PLO leadership went a long way into negotiations with Israel, in
recognising Israel as a state, and in embarking on more liberal political and economic
principles. Besides, being based on the PLO, the Palestinian National Authority (PNA)
seemed to have the legitimacy, coherence and control necessary to implement most of its
policies.
However, largely because of the conflict with Israel, informal, clientelist, monopolist and
coercive tendencies developed at the detriment of popular participation, transparency and
accountability. This pointed to a possible enduring mal-development of the political
institutions with increasing levels of corruption and rent-seeking.  Thus, since the PLO-based
Palestinian Authority started to operate and develop, and in particular since 1997, accusations,
revelations and scandals of corruption increased in numbers and intensity. According to
various reports (of which the Rocard-Siegman Report from 1998 was the single most
influential), there was political corruption in the Presidency, involving high-ranking political
figures and PLO officers, and widespread bureaucratic corruption within nearly all
administrative bodies. Although Yasser Arafat was not personally and openly criticised,
corruption was said to be systemic in Palestine and to have reached the highest circles,
including the president's office.
The purpose of this report is to identify some of these trends and to assess whether the
Palestinian quasi-state incorporated traits of developmental or non-developmental (predatory,
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client, and clientelist/neopatrimonial) states. Did the Palestinian quasi-state have the qualities
necessary for a viable social and economic transformation, and the prospects to be a
developmentalist state?
Our basic arguments are as follows: On the one hand, the Palestinian process of state
formation included a number of characteristics that bode well for a developmental oriented
state that could ensure the transformation of Palestine into an economically and politically
dynamic and viable entity; a developmental state. In the outset, the Palestinian National
Authority seemed to have the coherence, coordination, legitimacy and political will necessary
to bring about deep social, economic and political transformations. On the other hand, the
obstacles were almost insurmountable and certain factors came to point in the opposite
direction: fragmentation and internal conflicts over scarce resources and the use of state
resources to buy the support necessary for regime survival from certain powerful factions and
groups in society.
The methodology employed is comparative and eclectic. We identify some of the background
conditions for corruption in Palestine, following current theoretical and comparative literature
on conditions considered conducive to corruption. Of particular interest are autocratic rule,
the transitory and violent phase of state formation, poverty, and foreign influence and
dependency.
From our conceptual division between formal and informal powers, we will assess the
presence of conditions that favoured the establishment and deepening of a rent-seeking
neopatrimonial regime in Palestine. From our attempt to describe and illustrate some of the
forms of corruption that existed, we will assess the implications further in terms of regime
characteristics.
First, we will analyse the formal powers in terms of checks and balances within the formal
political system. This is necessary in order to assess the scope of corrupt practices in
Palestine. Corruption and mismanagement are factors that will seriously reduce the legitimacy
of a state, and consequently its developmental capacity. Despite a system of presidentialism
and centralisation of power, which could have produced a strong and development-oriented
Palestinian state, a number of traits pointed to a rather weak political state authority. We have
noted factors like weak accountability and transparency, the confusion over the chain of
command, an overlap between institutions, inefficiency in public administration and a duality
of controls, as well as unsettled legal codes and practices.
Secondly, we will analyse the informal power networks, including interactions and power
divisions within the Palestinian polity. In addition to capacity, a developmental state will also
need coherence and structure. We will endeavour to identify the political networks that
pushed the Palestinian state in the direction of clientelist practices, like informal powers,
wasta (mediation) and mehsubia (patronage), and the localised, clientelist ‘fiefdoms’. Some
patterns of public and economic power distribution that might have contributed to predatory
practices  will also be touched upon.
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2 Corruption and Institutionalisation
Corruption is a phenomenon that develops and sustains under certain conditions. Among these
are the political culture and traditions of a regime, processes of state formation,
underdeveloped economic systems, and dependency on foreign powers. Although no direct
comparisons between Palestine and other countries known for corrupt practices have been
made, a sufficiently large number of system indicators existed from which there is reason to
believe that corruption was to become widespread and entrenched in Palestine. In fact,
Palestine scored high on most of the indicators conducive to corruption, conditions which the
following section will outline.
2.1 Corruption in Palestine
The PLO leadership always promoted a strong state in Palestine, in full control of political
powers and state institutions “solely for national interest”, because of the enduring conflict
situation with Israel. Furthermore, Israel and the Western powers emphasised “security” for
Israel through the Oslo Agreements and made this an issue more important than democratic
institutionalisation in Palestine. This “security first” claim resulted in an ineffective
parliament and judiciary, and in poor mechanisms for democratic checks and balances.  Thus,
Palestine scored relatively low on political freedoms and social equality (US Department of
State 2000), in particular freedom of the press, with extensive self-censorship.
Typically under regime transitional circumstances, the basic political and economic rules and
regulations are vague and fluctuating, and this opens new resources up for ‘grabs’ for various
economic interests and social segments. Besides, a wide range of social and conflicts erupts,
such as between revolutionary and post-independence ideologies, pragmatic and dogmatic
approaches, and modern and traditional norms. Associated with the changes in economic
opportunities and unsettled rules, norms and values, a vacuum tends to develop, rendering a
society norm-less and allowing people to behave in ways justified by neither old norms, nor
new ones (Amundsen 1999).
In Palestine, the new state institutions never gained full political legitimacy, operational
capacity or independent bodies for oversight and control necessary to establish its supremacy.
There was for instance an unfortunate overlap in the authorities and mandates of the PLO and
the PNA.
The unsettled and precarious political condition also gave more prominence to immediate
action and short-term interests than to the long-term objectives of democracy and
development.  Thus, there was a high focus on the task of national reconstruction at the
detriment of developing democratic practices. In fact, national reconstruction came to embody
- even substitute - the historic struggle for national and democratic rights. This focus
suppressed acknowledgment of the devastating impact that informal institutions (clientelism,
particularity, patronage and corruption) might have on the political system. In this context,
calls for transparent and accountable political and administrative conduct, institutionalisation
and obedience to the rule of law were brushed away and dismissed as untimely or even
luxurious trivialities.
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Quantitative research on corruption has established that on average the governments in poor
countries are the most corrupt. Their political leaders and state officials are particularly prone
to public power abuse for private benefit (Klitgaard 1988, Della Porta and Meny 1997,
Paldam 1999, Lambsdorff 1999). This indicates a medium to high level of corruption in the
relatively poor Palestine. Furthermore, the import-oriented nature of the Palestinian economy
enhanced the emergence of monopolies and state owned companies, a situation tending to
enhance politically mediated access to resources. Under transitional conditions, spoils
distribution (like monopoly rights, preferences in the import/export business, accommodations
in politically favoured sectors and other income possibilities) were used deliberately to secure
the support of important political and economic interests, leaving full discretion to an non-
transparent administration and thus opening the doors for corrupt practices. As politically
mediated new business opportunities were created and old ones transferred to new
individuals, possibilities for quick enrichment were created for those who had the best
political connections and political levers.
While there are positive financial effects to foreign aid, it tends to weaken the moral and
political obligation of the citizenry to question the ruler and to hold him accountable in the
various political, economic, and security spheres. In Palestine, the influence of the donor
countries was shown to have a substantial impact on the status of corruption. As the regime’s
income and assets were divided almost evenly between taxation of the domestic economy and
foreign aid, a large portion of the moneys spent was not extracted from the nation’s own
taxpayers (see Fjeldstad and Zagha), and this left officials rather independent of domestic
popular demands and pressures.
Foreign influence, however, reaches even farther. The entire political field in Palestine was
developed with the Interim Agreements, with Israel being its main term of reference. For
example, the elected legislative council (PLC) was far from being a sovereign body and its
authority and mandate were scattered and limited, geographically and functionally. Thus,
although the Oslo Agreement authorised the creation of a Palestinian legislative body, it was
restricted from legislating on a wide range of issues, leaving these subject to final status
negotiations. This limited sovereignty of the Palestinian legislature severely weakened its
initiatives and ability to combat corruption.
Lastly, high levels of illiteracy, huge income differentiation, weak civil society organisations,
popular expressions, increasingly concerned NGOs, the many popular allegations and
rumours and press reports (despite the dangers of reporting), were all social and cultural
indications pointing to widespread corruption in the Palestinian quasi-state. There is no smoke
without a fire.
2.2 The Need for Institutions
An institutional approach to assess formal and informal power structures is essential for
several reasons.
First, a developmental state needs a relatively high degree of authority and autonomy in order
to push through the necessary socioeconomic transformation. Development through economic
growth is a messy process in which certain interests will have to be contained and others
promoted. This authority partly rests on the coercive means of a regime. But additionally, a
certain level of legitimacy and support is required for the long-term sustainability of a
developmentalist programme. Legitimacy and support might be characteristics of either a
popular and populist authoritarian regime, or a democratic, elected regime. For the sake of
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short-term grand transformations, a populist authoritarian regime is usually more efficient, as
demonstrated through some military take-overs by younger officers. Such regimes have,
unfortunately, no institutional or other guarantee that they will be or stay developmentalist
oriented. For the sake of long-term stability and legitimacy, democratic regimes that are more
open to inclusion, equality, standard procedures and redistribution, are consequently
preferable.
Secondly, political democracy requires a design of the political system that is institutionally
inclusive, balanced, and relatively efficient. The degree of inclusiveness can be seen in the
level of system contestation, measured as how often and how seriously the system itself is
disputed and challenged by social groups protesting against exclusion. When large and
powerful groups are considering the political system and its leaders as illegitimate, the regime
will usually become paralysed. Democratic principles (one man one vote, freedom of
assembly, organisation, information and speech, respect for human rights and minority rights,
and free and fair elections) are meant to secure a minimum level of participation and inclusion
from which many regimes draw legitimacy.
Furthermore, a certain balance between contending powers in society is required for a
democratic system to operate. If a relatively small and coherent group or class captures the
state apparatus, public capacities will undoubtedly be used for the benefit of that group or
class’ vested interests. The end result might be a predatory state, a state captured by the ruling
elite. In precarious political situations rulers tend to have short-term interests ant to “take out”
as much as possible, and this will definitely be the detriment of long-term planning and
development.
According to Max Weber the most efficient capitalist developing state is a state with
counterbalancing powers where no group can turn to the easy way of parasite accumulation
(Weber 1981:300, Callaghy 1988:68-77, 83). The only way of securing this is in practice is
through a democratic system that guarantees the basic rights of contestation and opposition.
In stable, democratic systems, the formal institutions (the executive, legislative and judicial
branches of government) are the main mechanisms for internal checks and balances.
Institutions are the main arena for horizontal accountability and control, as well as for
contending groups (vertical accountability, participation and control). In more precarious
systems, however, like newly established regimes, transitional regimes and regimes engaged
in external conflict, that is, when the basic rules of the game are unsettled and unregulated, the
informal arenas for conflict and cooperation becomes more important.
Informal politics - the power games going on outside of the formally established channels -
are of course essential in any political system, but more so in transitory situations where the
rules of the game are unsettled. An institutional approach, which includes the questions of
balance and inclusion in the informal as well as the formal political spheres, is therefore
suggested in the following. This also makes it possible to develop criteria by which the
influence of the formal and informal institutions on each other can be assessed, and
furthermore gauge the political system’s propensity to protect vested interests or to engage in
national development.
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3 Formal Political Institutions in Palestine
The Palestinian political system (1994-2000) was a mixed type of government, with
parliamentarian and presidential elements existing side by side. The parliamentarian element
was manifest in the presence of an elected council (parliament, PLC) with the authority of
enacting laws and guiding public policies. The presidential element was apparent through the
president who derived his legitimacy from the people through direct election.
The Palestinian political system was, however, definitely closer to the presidential mode of
government, with its extraordinary degree of power concentration. The executive, and
particularly the presidency, enjoyed in formal terms almost unrestricted powers. Compared to
its counterparts in other polities, it was restricted by very few and very weak institutional
countervailing forces. The executive held the lion’s share of the resources and assets
(coercive, economic, and symbolic), and acted almost unchallenged by legislative and judicial
restraints. Democratic and institutionalised checks and balances never developed, but were
passed over for the sake of sake of the national struggle.1
3.1 The Executive
The top executive consisted of the Office of the Presidency, the Board of Ministers and the
Security Forces. It supervised the negotiations and implementation of the various agreements
with Israel and it negotiated agreements and treaties with foreign countries in the various
economic, financial, administrative and semi-diplomatic fields. The cabinet laid down and
implemented the general policy of the government. The executive supervised the
administrative organs, prepared and approved the annual budget before it was presented to the
PLC, initiated and proposed legislation to the council, and issued secondary legislation,
including orders, decrees, and regulations. It ratified legislation enacted by the PLC, set up the
courts and appointed judges, and granted pardons and commuted sentences.
The structure of the executive branch was rather intricate because of a direct overlap of PNA
and PLO institutions (Sayigh and Shikaki 1999). One of the clearest examples was that on the
one hand there was the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) and its Executive Authority
(government), and on the other hand there was the Palestine National Council (PNC, the PLO
parliament-in-exile) and the PLO Executive Committee. The PNA cabinet and the PLO
Executive Committee were hardly distinguishable and largely overlapping, both in functions
and membership. Furthermore, there was a ‘Palestinian leadership’, a loosely defined group of
PNA ad PLO officials. This body was designed to handle the negotiations with Israel, but it
also dealt with internal affairs, operating in a crisis management style. In fact, meetings of this
organ replaced the cabinet for all practical purposes. Dominated by the PLO, the policy
decisions of this body were not subject to accountability by neither the PLC nor any other
PNA body (Sayigh & Shikaki 1999, Rubin 1999).
While the PNA was the official governing body, much of the actual authority rested with the
PLO. Note that the PLO did not recognise the PLC as the sole representative of the
Palestinians, because the PLC constituency covered only the estimated 2.3 million inhabitants
                                                  
1 The major constraint to the Palestinian executive powers was external, however, and this to such a degree that
its mere existence was threatened, and finally almost completely destroyed with the siege of the presidential
compound by Israeli forces and the house arrest of the Palestinian president, from June 2002.
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of the occupied territories and not the estimated 3.5 million Diaspora Palestinians. The PNC,
on the other hand, considered itself as the representative of all Palestinians, both in the
occupied territories and in the Diaspora. While in formal terms the PNA had the authority of
administering the internal affairs of the occupied territories, it had no authority in the spheres
of foreign relations, peace negotiations or in signing agreements. These tasks were the
responsibility of the PLO and were performed by the Arafat-appointed ‘Palestinian
leadership’.
Constitutionally, the executive branch needed approval of the PLC for its major policies, but
in reality the most important political and economic policies were formulated, implemented,
and assessed by the executive authority alone, without PLC approval. Moreover, the executive
disregarded many PLC decisions and laws in the areas of democracy, human rights,
administration and budgets. The president did not sign many of the laws enacted by the PLC,
such as the Basic Law, which is crucial for the institutionalisation of any democratic system.
Until 2001, he had ratified only three laws enacted by the PLC, two of them in the area of
local government, and the other in the area of public budgeting. Furthermore, the executive
power and its security apparatus occasionally obstructed the work of the PLC and its
committees. For example, the council refused means of obtaining information, such as insight
into documents requested to facilitate investigation of suspected corruption and other
violations. Ministers were neither helpful nor forthcoming towards the PLC’s requests of
holding hearings regarding various charges. They were slow to reply, when they did not
completely withhold documents and information from the council. Finally, findings of
commissions of inquiry set up by the executive authority, such as the Presidential Anti-
Corruption Commission, were not released to the PLC (let alone the public) (Sayigh &
Shikaki 1999).
The executive completely monopolised the negotiations with Israel. It refused to submit the
Hebron Protocol before the PLC for discussion and approval; it did not comply with the
PLC’s decision to put the negotiations with Israel on hold in the aftermath of the Jewish
settlement activities on Abu-Ghnaim mountain; and it disregarded the PLC’s decision to hold
negotiations until the Israeli government fully executed the first and second phase of
redeployment of its troops from the West Bank. Thus, the parliamentary branch was largely
encroached and marginalized by the executive apparatus in Palestine.
The executive also monopolised other parts of the public arena. It extended its dominance to
include the judiciary, where the president enjoyed the power of appointing the members of the
Supreme Court and the Attorney General. He could issue decrees to establish local and
regional courts. Moreover, several court decisions were simply disregarded. These decisions
were in the areas of democracy, economy, and in social matters. There were decisions
regarding corruption in the various public agencies and institutions, and decisions regarding
the violations of human rights and civil liberties committed by the security authority.
There was a further concentration and overlap of executive functions and responsibilities.
President Arafat was not only the Chairman of the PLO and the President of the PNA, he
exercised many other functions as well, such as the presidency of the strongest PLO member
organisation (Fatah) and the leadership of the various security and semi-military groups
(Legrain 1999). Consequently, his powers (and legitimacy) were not based primarily on the
fact that he was popularly elected in 1992 as the PNA Interim President, but rather from the
fact that he was the chairman of the PLO and Fatah. Endowed with all these functions, the
head of the executive operated blatantly in violation of the principle of checks and balances,
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he bypassed the representative bodies, and relied heavily on informal powers ad political
decrees.
The executive controlled the budget of the Palestinian Authority as well. The first budgets
were covered partly by grants from the PLO and partly by contributions from international
donors. The shares were about 50:50. This direct contribution from the PLO to the PNA
implies in itself a total confusion of the two circuits. Recently, the income from domestic
sources, from taxation, customs, and revenue transfers from Israel, etc. has been slowly
increasing, but it remains still rather insignificant. According to one of the agreements with
Israel, the Israelis are to collect taxes from Palestinians in area C, and customs on all
Palestinian international trade, and to hand over a certain percentage of this to the Palestinian
Authority. But, according to some reports, the Palestinian Presidency requested that Israel
should transfer this money on a regular basis to a Tel Aviv bank and into two bank accounts
controlled by the president himself and one other PLO officer only.
This performance of the executive caused much criticism. There was disapproval of the
manner by which public policies were formulated and conducted, discontentment with the
mismanagement of public funds, overstaffed institutions, corruption, violation of human
rights, and dissatisfaction with the poor Palestinian performance in the negotiations with
Israel. The executive responded to this popular (as well as external) criticism merely with
suspicion and distrust. Frequently, criticism was deemed unjustified, since it “did not serve
the Palestinian national interest”. Opposition groups, NGOs and other civil society forces
were accused of exaggerating the faults committed by the PNA, while their criticism was
portrayed as reflecting foreign interests. In some instances, the executive allowed to some
extent for investigation into issues such as corruption and mismanagement of government
funds, but no concrete and satisfactory action were taken against violators.
3.2 The Palestinian Legislative Council
The establishment of a Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) through the general election of
January 1996 was one of the major achievements of the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian
lawmakers have since accumulated valuable experience and demonstrated growing capability
to debate legislation, government policies, and budgets. Besides, among the 88 Council
members some 35 were independent candidates (and some of them critics) of Arafat and his
Fatah faction.
Over the years up till 2001, the PLC passed several important laws, but with the lack of a
basic law and a clear constitutional order, laws that were adopted by the PLC rarely found
their way to the president’s desk for signature. This nullified the decisions of the legislators,
mocked its responsibilities, and aborted the principle of promulgation. The few laws that were
indeed ratified were endorsed only after they were reformulated to meet the president’s
expectations. One example is the draft law to regulate NGO organisations, their registration
and activities, the ‘Charitable Associations and Community Organisations Law’. This law was
passed by the PLC, but the president has not promulgated it. Therefore, the General
Intelligence Directorate and the Ministry of the Interior continued to make separate attempts
to compel NGOs to report to them, and there was a continuing dispute between the ministries
of interior, justice and social affairs over which one should register NGOs.
The legislative branch faced the challenge of a deliberate and comprehensive marginalisation.
With the lack of a constitutional framework, the PLC lacked credible mechanisms for
enforcing its decisions. Furthermore, the Oslo framework provisions were amended with PLO
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Executive Committee specifications that concentrated considerable power in the hands of the
president, who became bestowed with an US-style veto over the legislature. This situation left
the PLC with few constitutional sanctions to enforce executive compliance, deprived of the
right to insight and oversight, and bereft of any power to efficiently control decision-making
on broad policy issues. Thus, the council has not been able to supervise the decisions of the
president or to hold him accountable.
PLC control over the financial situation of the PNA was also weak, despite US and World
Bank demands for strengthening the PLC budgetary powers. While the PLC was formally
bestowed with budget responsibilities, the first (and so far last) cabinet report of public
revenues and expenditures (of April 1999) was not broken down to details and not in line with
approved budgets. Besides, there were large sums of ‘non-budgetary expenditures’, i.e. PLO
assets and expenses outside of any PLC control. Even when the situation was finally
improved due to persistent donor pressure, the Palestinian Legislative Council not only failed
to have full oversight over the national economy in practice, it still has not even the formal
right to know all incomes and expenditures.
The legislative branch was further undermined because of various overlaps. First, there was
the overlap and confusion of authority between the PLC and the PNC, as mentioned above.
Also, there was an overlap between the legislative and the executive domain, as most of the
PLC members had official governmental posts as well. They were ministers, advisors, heads
of governmental agencies, or appointed municipal and regional leaders. Actually, some PLC
members saw their executive positions as more important than their legislative duties, since
these positions provided them with more access to real decision making power. Being
executive as well as legislative actors, the basic principle of horizontal accountability was
seriously undermined.
Partisanship constituted another impediment to the effectiveness of the PLC. The majority of
the council’s members, its speaker and his two deputies, as well as the general secretary all
belonged to one party, Fatah.2 Thus, while the PLC was formally bestowed with the right to
use its vote of non-confidence, it failed to use this power vis-à-vis the executive.3 If not the
above-mentioned overlap of functions between members of the executive and the legislative
would suffice to hamper it, the Fatah majority of the PLC would never allow its use. In the
words of one analyst, this situation led the system of majoritarian decision-making into
stagnant rule (Amal Jamal 2000).
Partisanship reached even further. Fatah also dominated the executive bodies of the PNA,
such as the ministries, the security apparatus, governor’s offices, mayor’s offices, municipal
committees, and local government offices, all of which were filled by presidential
appointment.
Last but not least, practical problems were hampering the functioning of the PLC. For
instance did the council have offices and meeting halls in both Gaza and in Ramallah, and its
members consequently needed an Israeli permit to travel and had to pass Israeli checkpoints
quite frequently. This caused much frustration. Even when the PLC members enjoy
                                                  
2 This was unfortunate, but hardly avoidable given the boycott of the election by the opposition groups. It is
worth noting that the boycott came about partly because the original devising of the electoral system favoured
Fatah as the largest political party.
3 The right was used when in September 2002 the cabinet was forced to resign after being threatened with a vote
of no confidence by the Legislative Council.
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parliamentary immunity, they were subject to harassment by both Israeli and Palestinian
security.
The following incident is a telling example of the practical working problems of the PLC. In
late 1998, a special budget and oversight committee of the Palestinian Legislative Council
issued a report that revealed:
· Abuse of public position for financial gain in the area of state monopolies,
· Acquirement of tenders by non-legitimate means for companies that have connections
with persons in public positions,
· Appointment of individuals on the basis of nepotism,
· Facilitation of permits and tax cuts for unqualified individuals based on personal
relations, and
· Abuse of public properties for personal use.
The Palestinian media totally ignored this investigation (the details were only available to
Palestinians through Israeli media), and the president’s reaction was to issue a blunt warning
that also lawmakers could face punishment over offending statements (Shuaibi 1999, Rubin
1999:41, Al-Tashri'i 1998:4-5, 21).
The Committee then recommended that the cabinet should be dissolved and that a new
cabinet should be formed in which none of the ministers stated in the report should be
included. The result was that a new cabinet was established, but virtually all of those ministers
accused of corrupt practices were back in place - only with a different portfolio. Ironically,
when Arafat submitted the names of his new government, he won a vote of confidence.
Subsequently, two ministers, who had not been cited in the report, resigned from the cabinet
because of the lack of proper political action to deal with the corruption charges and the lack
of administrative reform.
3.3 The Judiciary
In Palestine, there was no constitution and no basic law to ensure independence of the
judiciary. The Palestinian legislative council approved a draft basic law (the “Law of the
Land”) as a constitution for the PNA, but the executive branch has not promulgated this
document (Sayigh & Shikaki 1999). The chairman neither promulgated the Judicial System
Law, which was passed late 1998 and meant to guarantee the independence of the judiciary.
Furthermore, the post of Attorney General was placed directly under the executive authority,
and the president made appointments to this post, like he appointed judges at all levels.4
In other words, Palestinian citizens’ civil and political rights were poorly codified and void of
fundamental principles to guide the establishment, functions, autonomy and separation of the
three branches of government. In addition, there was no Constitutional Court to ensure that
laws and regulations were constitutional, and the Supreme Court was not empowered to
judicial review.
Enforcement of the rule of law was furthermore impracticable because the judicial system was
understaffed. Important judicial positions were kept vacant for a long time, and the president
                                                  
4 In the words of Sayigh and Shikaki (1999), “President Arafat and his Justice Minister retain the powers to
appoint, promote, demote, transfer, dismiss, and retire judges at all levels; establish and close local and regional
courts; hire and dismiss court personnel; and determine salaries and pensions”. (Sayigh & Shikaki 1999).
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removed judges from office for both critical statements and unfavourable court decisions
(Rubin 1999; U.S. Department of State 2000). Instead, some responsibilities were taken over
by traditional social institutions and practices, and public officials were taking up other parts
of the tasks of the justice, in a disorganised and informal way. Finally, some decisions were
made by Security and Military Courts, which rather than being controlled by the Ministry of
Justice, also subordinated only to the president, who confirmed or rejected every decision.
Lack of independence of the judiciary from the executive branch of government seriously
hindered the rule of law. The executive preferred to rule by decree and to use the range of
legal codes selectively. In fact, there were Ottoman, British, Jordanian, Egyptian and Israeli
regulations in force, contributing to the weak and irresolute legal basis of Palestine.
According to Palestinian lawmakers, the chairman used the power accorded to him by
international agreements in order to issue primary legislation in the guise of secondary
legislation, so that it did not need PLC approval (Sayigh & Shikaki 1999). Furthermore, the
executive simply ignored many important judicial orders (US State Department 2000).
For example, in 1997 the Attorney General ordered the release of eleven student detainees
held for up to two years without charge or trial. They were released but immediately re-
arrested by the Preventive Security Forces. This manoeuvre undermined the status of the
Attorney General who indeed later resigned because of continuous intervention by the
minister of justice and by heads of the various security forces.
In political terms, the judiciary was in a permanent state of deliberate political
marginalisation, and in practical terms in a state of operational crisis, as there were shortages
of judges, prosecutors, court administrators and other staff, and an extreme task and
responsibility overload. As a result, citizen’s civil and political rights were frequently violated
in the name of security. The security forces made arrests with no clear charges and prisoners
were subjected to harsh captivity conditions and a number died in detention. The State
Security Court, however, revived and utilised a wide range of emergency laws inherited from
previous rulers, and made harsh and speedy sentences.
3.4 The Security Forces
A wide range of security forces existed in the West Bank and Gaza, all of which were directly
under the president’s command (Luft 1999). They enjoyed such a degree of power and
influence that they could not be ignored by any other powers in Palestine. Elected
representatives, local and central authorities, members of the opposition, rivals and any
influence seeker among the dominant elites, be it politicians, bureaucrats or business figures,
had to take the security forces into account. In fact, according to a perception held by a wide
part of the public, there was an uncontrolled and ad hoc proliferation of security agencies.
When the PNA was established, the security groups were concentrated around the Police
Force, which was assigned the task of maintaining security and order and to protect the PNA
in general. Later, the security groups consisted of (about) twelve agencies, the police force
alone employed about 30 000 people, and these were able to impact considerably on the
various spheres of life under the PNA.
Security forces played a crucial role in keeping the emerging entity under the PNA intact.
They were present in the various districts and areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and
their composition entailed former PLO guerrilla units, returned Palestinians, and former
intifada activists. In theory, the security groups were subordinate to the Higher Council of
National Security, a body that comprised of the heads of all security groups and assigned the
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task of providing advice on internal security issues. They were to report to the central
command in each area, as the local Governors of the districts were officially the highest chiefs
of all PNA institutions and organs (!), including the various security forces.
However, the separation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip and the division of the
Palestinian territories into areas A, B, and C forced the PNA to form parallel commands and
branches, which fragmented the security apparatus. Besides, the Council lacked clarity of
rules and procedures, and its missions and responsibilities remained vague and informal.
Among the various groups, divisions of labour and exact duties and responsibilities were
either unclear or inexistent, and there was a lack of coordination among the various groups, at
times among the various units within the same group. The overlap of functions and confusion
further weakened those proper rules and legal procedures that did exist. Finally, all security
groups were founded and remained closely controlled by the president. Formally, the PNA
president was himself the head of the Higher Council of National Security, and in practice the
security forces all reported to him, separately and directly.
Concerning their finances, security agencies had their own budgets independent from the
ministry of finance and thus subjected to neither Ministry or PLC oversight and control, nor to
external audit. The portion of the general budget spent on security agencies represented the
single largest item of PNA recurrence expenditure, accounting for over thirty percent of the
general budget (Sayegh & Shikaki 1998:117). In addition, each security group secured some
of its own finances, using a wide range of means that sometimes went far beyond what was
legal or ethical. In their pursuit of power and resources, security group officials committed
human rights violations, practiced corruption, and were involved in undeclared commercial
activities as well as unauthorized tax collection.
Personal rivalry contributed to the worsening of the internal environment of the security
groups. Security chiefs viewed their agencies as power bases and as means to achieve private
gains. To this end, they allied themselves with Fatah chapters and influential clans. Heads of
security agencies always sought the support and approval of the Fatah faction in their local
area in order to be able to function. Loyalty was a crucial theme. While some groups, the
National Guard for instance, made sure that the various West Bank branches were headed by
individuals of Gaza origin, all groups, except for the Preventive Security Forces, were
heralded by individuals known as ‘returnees’, known for their special loyalty to the PLO and
Chairman Arafat.
3.5 The Ministries
The public administration in the Palestinian Authority was weak and inexperienced, and
without a basic law and procedural principles its organisational evolution was rather
haphazard. There were competing chains of command, insufficient delegation of authority,
excessive compartmentalisation in certain respects, and a lack of departmental autonomy in
others. Besides, there were inadequate formal procedures, insufficient flows of information,
and inadequate audits and internal controls. There was an almost complete lack of audit
generals, ombudsmen, and anti-corruption agencies.
There was only one ombudsman, and a relatively weak Palestinian Independent Commission
for Citizens’ Rights, both established by presidential decree. Commissions nominated by the
president himself were investigating most cases dealing with human rights abuses (for
instance incidents of detainees died in custody or under torture), even instances regarding
consumer rights. However, few of the reports or findings of these commissions were released
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or publicly debated, and officials who were criticised were rarely reprimanded or brought to
justice.
A duplication of functions and redundancy of institutions prevailed, such as the many parallel
departments in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. While the PNA had a significantly inflated
payroll, several sectors were understaffed, in particular those requiring specialised or highly
qualified personnel. In the civil service there were overstaffing and job inflation in most
ministries and agencies, in particular at the top levels of appointment. The desire to ease
unemployment, combined with political and personal factors, partially converted public hiring
into a means of rewarding political loyalty. This left the Palestinian Authority with a much
higher proportion of the labour force in public employment than is the case in other post-
conflict countries. The result of this favouritism and corruption was low quality and little
efficiency in public services. It inflated the wage bill and future pension requirements, and
threatened the domestic legitimacy of the PNA.
Planning and prioritisation greatly improved during the period 1994-2000, as the Ministry for
Planning and International Cooperation gradually assumed the central role for these matters.
Nevertheless, competition among PNA institutions for donor assistance also led some donors
to conclude direct arrangements with PNA ministries, regional agencies, and municipalities.
In the cases when separate PNA institutions tried to ‘shop’ for funding, priorities were
confused. Donor support for competing institutions also worsened administrative
fragmentation.
Comparative studies suggest that executive dominance in precarious circumstances opens up
for short-termism, for personal and political interventions in administrative matters, and for
rewarding political loyalty through favouritism and clientelism. Besides, in a situation of
inconsistent, unstable and unpredictable rules and regulations, public officials have a
particularly large room to extort bribes, to take “fees” for delivering services that are
inadequately codified or even known to the public. They can also demand commissions for all
kinds of services (be that licenses, permits, exempts, deductions and releases). These factors
definitely played a role in Palestine.
3.6 Governorships and Municipal Authorities
Representative institutions at the local level (municipalities, mayors, village councils) were
originally granted certain powers, but this was largely subverted by increased powers to non-
elected bureaucracies, like the regional governors attached to the Ministry of Interior and
nominated by the president (Dajani n.d., Sayigh & Shikaki 1999). There was, for example, a
centralisation of revenue collection away from municipal authorities, and the transfers of state
funds to local and municipal authorities were unsystematic and politicised since there was no
relevant legislation (Sayigh & Shikaki 1999). After the complete halt of transfers of taxes and
duties collected by Israel on Palestinian trade and labour, the transfer of funds to local
authorities has been even more politicised, and local sources of revenue have become
increasingly more important to local authorities.
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4 Informal Power Structures
In addition to the deficient institutional arrangements and undemocratic elements mentioned
above, a number of informal political characteristics indicated a clientelist and neopatrimonial
trend in Palestine. It is not possible at this point to say that it would have become a fully-
fledged clientelist or neopatrimonial state, but a number of attributes to this fledgling state
were indeed compatible with the label neopatrimonial.
4.1 Neopatrimonialism
The term denotes a political system in which the outer appearance and the institutions of a
legal-rational state are in place, but where the actual power rests with deeply embedded
patrimonial logic and on patron-client relationships. Neopatrimonial regimes are consequently
different from corporatist states, one-party or military dictatorships, and different from
institutionalised democracies. They are semi-democratic, relatively stable presidential systems
with a number of additional qualifying features. In neopatrimonial systems, the chief
executive maintains authority through personal patronage rather than through ideology or law.
The right to rule is ascribed to a person rather than an office, and relationships of loyalty and
dependence pervade the formal political and administrative systems. The distinction between
private and public is purposely blurred, and in essence politics is about awarding favours to
clients. In return for loyalty and political support, such awards could be public sector jobs,
contracts, licenses and immaterial benefits, like belonging (Bratton & van de Walle, 1994).
Next to personalised presidential power, systematic clientelism is the key institution of
neopatrimonial regimes. Personal loyalty to the ruler is established by using the stick and
carrot strategy, exercised through his power to appoint and dismiss, to hire and fire, and to
forgive and reappoint when opportune. The carrot is letting individuals get access to the
prestige and fringe benefits of positions in the ministries, state agencies and parastatals
(sometimes with considerable additional possibilities for rents and grease money). Up-coming
individuals and individuals with a personal power base, a clientele of their own, tend to be co-
opted into the system through nomination and special treatment. Corporate loyalty and
collective allegiance from important constituencies is secured basically by nominating one of
theirs. The stick is typically the threat to withdraw presidential favours, including one’s
position and all the benefits that have come with it, but could in some instances also bring
peril to a person’s freedom and life.
Political corruption is an integrated part of the clientelist system. Political corruption is one of
the economic backbones of the state elite; it is the basis of its domination and survival. The
extractive capacity of the state apparatus is one of the raisons d’être of holding power in
neopatrimonial regimes, and constitutes what various groups are fighting over. Besides, in
neopatrimonial states, corruption and patron-client relations overlap into a pyramid of upward
extraction. Note that patrimonial relations are not balanced. The flow of resources benefits the
patron more than it benefits the clients, because each patron has a large number of clients in
his web, and the patron accumulates more than he redistributes.
As seen from other neopatrimonial experiences, a number of economic factors will contribute
to clientelism. A weak economic base with low levels of industrialisation will enable the
political elite to dominate an underdeveloped bourgeoisie, and to control and exploit the
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import-export sector. In a country where easy access to resources like mineral wealth;
strategic natural resources and/or international aid are constitutive characteristics, the ruling
elite is consequently relatively independent vis-à-vis the local economy, and relatively
immune to popular demands. It will furthermore give it the economic strength to buy off
rivals, to accommodate vital supporters in the clientelist network, and to buy the military
hardware and security necessary for its survival. Ultimately, a proliferation of security
services is a neopatrimonial ruler’s last resort.
In sum, in neopatrimonial systems a weakly institutionalised state with ineffective
constitutional and legal constraints will facilitate personal rule. The rules of the game will
purposely be blurred, while rule by decree and constitutional dodging will be the norm.
Besides, a relatively large distance between the rulers and the ruled, economically as well as
culturally, will reconfirm and sustain patron-client relationships.
4.2 Patronage in Palestine
Public opinion polls indicated that the Palestinian government was increasingly perceived as
corrupt. Resentments were especially strong in the economically struggling Gaza Strip, where
many people believed corruption stifled the kind of business activity that could help lift them
out of poverty (Associated Press 12 January 1999; Reuters 5 August 1998; Rubin 1999:67).
Local newspapers made revelations and accusations of corruption, despite repressive
reactions. They claimed that PNA security officers seized thousands of dollars from
Palestinians crossing from Egypt and Jordan into PNA areas when travellers were told they
were violating currency laws, but no one received receipts for the seized funds. Papers
reported that people had to pay kickbacks to avoid traffic tickets, that bribes were necessary to
obtain routine government services, and that PNA officials took bribes.
International news reports in late 1999 maintained that the PLO had salted away billions of
dollars in foreign bank accounts and investments, controlled only by the president himself and
two of his most trusted aides (Daily Telegraph 02.12.00 and 05.12.1999). In addition to
allegations of political and bureaucratic corruption, the Palestinian police and security forces
were criticised for human rights abuses, and the new leadership for power abuse (see for
instance U.S. Department of State 2000; Amnesty International 2000).
These allegations were part of an increasing criticism directed at the Palestinian leadership for
power abuse. Apparently, corruption was not a randomly distributed conduct, but rather it was
deeply entrenched, systematic and subject to certain patterns. Corrupt acts were committed to
consolidate and strengthen power and influence in the ongoing struggle for domination and
alliances, particularly between political and security figures for the post-Arafat era. Corrupt
acts were also committed as political entrepreneurs attempted to collect more assets, to secure
access to high positions in crucial areas in the system, and some even to arm groups that could
serve as a nucleus for future militias.
Thus, in Palestine, neopatrimonial logics of a political system seemed to be firmly in place.
One of the basic neopatrimonial dispositions was the accumulation of positions (formal and
informal) in the hands of Chairman Arafat. According to Jean-François Legrain (1999), the
chairman has accumulated some 30 functions, of which the most important were his
leadership of the PLO Executive Committee and of the Fatah Central Committee, the
presidency of the Palestinian national Authority, and his chief command of the numerous
security agencies. In addition to the executive, administrative and judicial branches of
government, a large number of national institutions and agencies, even NGOs were attached
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by presidential decree directly to the president’s office, which gave him the power to
nominate the heads and board members. For example, the chairman had in person intervened
and appointed heads and board members of important NGOs like the Bar Association (Sayigh
& Shikaki 1999).
The ministry of finance did not disburse approved budgets to ministries or agencies according
to fixed timetables and plans, even after approval of the PLC, but the minister and agency
heads concerned had to seek individual approval from the president (Sayigh & Shikaki 1999).
Institutional subordination was consequently transferred into personal dependence.
At the same time, the president indulged into micro-management of Palestine’s daily affairs,
not only the bigger decisions and appointments. This is a typical feature of neopatrimonial
states; the ultimate leader interferes with decision-making in any state office, indiscriminately
and unexpectedly, to demonstrate his superiority and personal control.
In controlling the finances of the PLO, the PNA, and of Fatah, the chairman secured personal
loyalty and dependence. When, or if, his followers strayed away or opposed him, he did not
hesitate to scandalise them, directing harsh accusations and allegations towards them. In
Palestine the stick was best known as the ‘Fakehani Rules’, the deadly gangster rules of
loyalty and treason that the PLO leadership and cadres had learned when in exile in Beirut
from 1971 to 1982.
Systematic co-optations and clientelism was present as well. Since there was no public
recruitment agency or employment exchange, the regulations regarding public recruitment
were weak. Informal ties, political loyalty, personal relationships and other patrimonial logics
prevailed, at the detriment of the meritocratic principle of education, experience and
efficiency. Like other neopatrimonial leaders, the Palestinian president developed a very
sophisticated system of internal balancing that accommodated most of the important
individuals and factions. Conservative traditional leaders (clan heads), Islamic figures and
radical leftist activists were to be found among the clients of Chairman Arafat. His ruling elite
had to accommodate and counterbalance on the one hand the traditional elites, and on the
other hand the more modern, institutionalised, educated and professional groups (Rubin
1999:17). As a result, the members of the ruling elite were not loyal to the president (only)
because of violence and fear, but because of a skilled and shrewed system of balancing
personal as well as corporate contenders.
Appointment was utilised not only to secure loyalty but also to revive traditional ties. The
PLO’s Executive Committee was enlarged in order to accommodate, among others, members
of traditional families (Al-Agha, Al-Khoudari, Al-Husseini, Al-Sheka'a). The Al-Qawasmi
clan and its web of relatives and friends dominated most of the high positions in the Ministry
of Transportation and its various regional offices. And while the Ministry of Health suffered
from a severe shortage of doctors, nurses and technicians, it had 60 general directors who
consumed 45% of the salaries in this ministry, and the salary of one director was equivalent to
the salary of four nurses. Overall, salaries made 72% of the total budget of this ministry and
among the people employed were old people in their seventies, wives of general directors and
persons residing outside the country (according to a report by the PLC on corruption in the
PNA, published 1997).
While the most important administrative positions were basically filled with people from the
PLO apparatus in exile and others who had proven their political loyalty to Arafat, the
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administrative apparatus further down was filled in a distinct clientelist manner. For instance,
whenever the Israelis were releasing Palestinian prisoners from custody, most of these people
were in a need for jobs. And since these were people who had proven their loyalty to the
‘cause’ and to the PLO, nothing was more natural that to give them jobs in the Palestinian
public administration - which secured their continued loyalty. The number of public personnel
expanded unchecked, with about 40% of the work force in Gaza on the public payroll (Sovich
2000).
The trade union leadership quandary can further illustrate the system of co-optation.
According to Nina Sovich, the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU) had
failed in its basic task of promoting worker’s rights, because the union leaders not only lacked
the discipline, expertise and political will, they were co-opted by the PNA as well (Sovich
2000). According to Barry Rubin, independents, leaders of smaller parties, individuals close
to Hamas (the major opposition group), and even critics were at least temporarily co-opted
(Rubin 1999:17).
4.3 Allegations of corruption and factional disputes
However, allegations of corruption also served as a weapon in the many power struggles
going on in Palestine, like for example between PLO organisations and various political
opponents, opposition parties, and dissident groups. There were struggles between the various
factions and rivals within the PLO leadership (people who were excluded, who had been in
the antechamber for too long, internal rivals etc.), between the various organisations of which
the PLO is the umbrella, between the PLO dominated executive and the not-so-PLO-
dominated PLC, and between the PNA leadership and the opposition. Rumours abounded,
some claims were rather wild and unfounded, and probably even the Israeli security and
intelligence agencies were ‘revealing’ or ‘producing evidence’ to discredit and weaken Arafat
and the PLO from time to time.
The proliferation of security agencies in Palestine was also symptomatic for a neopatrimonial
mode of rule. Coercion is the ultimate system backer of every political system, but was in
Palestine used as much against internal rivals as against external enemies, rather frequently
and routinely. To prevent army or security police ‘trouble’, and indeed to exclude the
possibility of a coup d’état, Chairman Arafat did, like a number of neopatrimonial presidents
before him, divide the bodies of coercion into a number of parallel services, with himself as
the commander in chief of them all. Even when the Palestinian state had not a military
apparatus as such, there were twelve different police, intelligence and security agencies, under
the umbrella of the GSS (General Security Services) commanded by Yasser Arafat (Luft
1999).
These security agencies were blamed for repeated human rights abuses, insufficient
observance of due process, inadequate separation of functions and responsibilities between
the various branches, and occasionally violent inter-service rivalries. This threatened the
performance of the various police branches and destroyed public approval and the confidence
of Israel and the international community.
The governing party (Fatah) was divided into many camps and power bases. One aspect of
this division in the West Bank was manifested in the form of a rift between the West Bank
leader of Fatah and his rival. However, the two allied themselves as local Fatah leaders when
conflicts arose with members of the Fatah Central Committee, whose members were mostly
returnees. This group included influential names, such as Abbas Zaki, Sakr Habash, and
Hakam Bal'awi among others, all men who enjoyed Arafat's support. When the West Bank
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leader of Fatah felt threatened he searched for backing and aligned himself with the head of
the Intelligence Service in the West Bank. Meanwhile, the head of the Preventive Security
Forces in the West Bank (rival of the Intelligence Services) became a strong supporter of the
Fatah leader’s rival. This alliance ended years of animosity between the latter two, animosities
that started when the one had been the temporary substitution of the other as director of the
Preventive Security Forces in 1999.
Competition and conflict over personal influence and power existed not only between the
different security forces, but also between the heads of the West Bank and Gaza branches of
these security groups. Within the Preventive Security Forces for instance, Mohamed Dahlan
was the head of the Gaza branch and competing with Al-Rujub who headed the West Bank
branch.
Officials of the Palestinian Authority were not shielded from negative effects of the intrigues
of such alliances and conflicts. One illustrative example is the support that the head of the
Preventive Security Forces enjoyed from the General Director of the Board of Ministers, and
from the Minister of Culture. Some observers explained the minister’s support to the Head of
the Preventive Security Forces with the latter’s need of protection due to his allegiance to a
small political faction (FIDA). In return, the Head of the Preventive Security Forces receiveed
political support against his rivals. Ties between these three have been strengthened after they
defeated a rival group from Gaza, who urged Arafat to accept Barak's proposal at Camp
David in September 2000 (Al-Ayyam newspaper 13.05.01 and 14.05.01).
Given this proliferation, it was even more disturbing that those who benefitted from
corruption were generally from the security forces, the civil service and the political and
economic elite. The intensity of corruption varied from one group to another. The Police
Force was perceived as the most corrupt. Other groups that dealt with security matters, such
as the Preventive Security Forces and the Intelligence Service, performed more complex
activities, due to their overlap with Fatah chapters and armed groups. These two groups stood
out as they were at the top of the ongoing struggle for influence and power consolidation.
Security forces were even involved in tax collection. The general prosecutor of Jericho
collected large sums of money as taxes from businesses, and kept it in his private bank
account without informing the ministry of finance. Allegedly, he amassed over four million
NIS. Taxpayers were even exposed to torture in the course of efforts to extract larger sums, as
reported by the Al-Raqeeb newspaper and revealed in hearings by the Oversight Committee
of the PLC in 1997.
Attempts were made to combat corruption by revealing corrupt practices to the public.
Ironically, internal conflicts between the various factions of Fatah seem to be the true driving
force behind these efforts. Since the eruption of the second intifada, many leaflets were
distributed among the general public, issued by a group that called itself The Brigades of the
Al-Aqsa Martyrs.5 This was not one homogenous group, and it could be conceived as a
collection of individual groups that were all (or believed to be) affiliated with Fatah. These
groups were independent of each other, each aiming to discredit a certain public figure while
praising another one in order to secure more power and influence for their protégé and
themselves. The different groups were insisting on using the name that associated them with
the struggle of the second intifada in order to stress their respective authenticity over other
factions.
                                                  
5 These leaflets have been used as a source of information in some of the following. Despite their clearly
propagandist nature, we believe they are illustrating and give some background information on certain conflicts,
ways of thinking, and group constellations.
C M I
19
Each leaflet attacked a prominent, influential political figure and accused him of corruption.
Among targeted individuals were members of the Palestinian leadership, including ministers
(such as the Minister of Civil Affairs), chiefs of security forces (such as the Head of the
Preventive Security Forces, and the Police Chief), PLO men, and one previous finance
minister of the PLO. They included businessmen, prominent Fatah figures, local leaders, and
a previous PLO representative in Tunis and PLC members from Tulkarem. Furthermore, each
faction was backed by a certain division of the security forces.6
One particular line of conflict can be noticed from these leaflets, namely between the upper
ranks, represented by the members of the Central Committee of Fatah, who are mostly
‘returnees’, and the younger leadership of the movement, mostly residents.
Another illustrative example of the political division and fragmentation within Fatah is an
incident that took place in a refugee camp near Nablus. The conflict arose over the
confiscation of weapons in the aftermath of the Wye Plantation Agreement in 1999. The
groups that became involved were the PNA police force, the respective Fatah branches of the
camp and the town, representatives from the municipality, and the governor of Nablus. Fatah
has not been able to internalise these conflicts of contradictory tendencies between the
champions of authority and the rebellious, the refugee camps and the city, and between the
central and the local authorities, as represented by the governor and the mayor. Overlapping
this fight was the historical rift between the governor's family (Al-'Aloul clan) and the
mayor's family (the Al-Shaqa'a clan). Furthermore, there was a group of Fatah members in
Nablus with contradictory alliances, since on the one hand they expressed their support to the
refugee camp; on the other hand (and for mutual benefit) they allied themselves with the
prominent family of the mayor of Nablus. It should be noted here that the refugee camp
received massive support from most other refugee camps in the West Bank and from the
Fatah activists in these camps. It even escalated to the point at which activists issued a leaflet
warning the PNA against entering the camp. A PLC member from the camp and a local Fatah
leader maintained when PNA security personnel approached the boundaries of the refugee
camp in an attempt to enter: "You will cross only over our dead bodies".
4.4 The corrupting economics of rent-seeking
Dominating the scene in the game of corruption was a coalition made up of Palestinian elites:
the upper bureaucracy, security forces officers, and the local bourgeoisie (bigger merchants,
investors, and contractors). The latter group was able to establish a political and economical
power base and to forge ties with Israeli and other foreign companies and firms.
Corruption occurred largely because individuals sought access to economic benefit either by
becoming partner in large business deals and transactions, or through monopolising certain
services or commodities. In this context, proximity to the Israeli side was important, as the
most influential individuals among the groups that practiced corruption were those who were
in a position that allowed, or even required them, to deal with the Israeli side. It was reported
that heads of local companies and firms who dealt with the Israeli side bribed PNA officials
with money and gifts. Influential PNA officials owned most new businesses, either through
direct and complete ownership, as subcontractors for foreign and Israeli companies, or
through partnership with the PNA itself. Examples include the Ministers for Planning &
International Cooperation and for Civil Affairs, the PLO leader himself, the head of the PLC.
                                                  
6 The leaflets featured heads of public agencies, such as the late Hisham Mikki, head of Palestinian state
television, who was slain in Gaza after severe allegations of corruption, and the chief of the Palestinian aviation
agency.
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In a 1995 report from the United States General Accounting Office on foreign assistance to
the PNA, it was concluded that the PLO and PNA budgets were neither transparent, nor
accounted for. Indeed, it stated that Chairman Arafat and his officials were opposed to any
financial controls, be they domestic parliamentary, independent, or donor driven (GAO 1995;
Frisch 1998). The Chairman and his inner circle enjoyed a near monopoly of control of the
entire economy of the Palestinian state. In the higher circles of power there was a tendency of
converting political position into private wealth as officials straddled into the semi-private and
private sectors. This process also generated downright corruption in terms of embezzlement,
fraud and “commissions”.
The report released by the Oversight and Human Rights Committee of the PLC in 1998
revealed another case regarding fees Palestinian travellers paid when passing through the
ports to Jordan and Egypt. Each traveller paid 121 NIS as travel fees but got a receipt for 117
NIS only. The sum might seem insignificant, but is estimated to sum up to about 1 million
NIS annually. The report included the names of each one involved, including officials in the
security forces, bureaucrats and politicians, among them one minister and a few directors and
general directors in the ministries.
As noted above, there is no strong and efficient judicial system in Palestine aimed at
combating corruption and power-abuse. Because legal channels did not function properly,
individuals resorted to wasta and bribery in order to avoid punishment, or to reach their aims.
Besides, judicial officials sometimes accepted bribes and commissions, and there were stories
about how they extracted money and exploited people involved in criminal or political
offences.
The argument here is that money extraction – or rent-seeking – was the common form of
corruption practised in the Palestine territories. The phenomenon of rent-seeking is another
common aspect in neopatrimonial and clientelist systems. Rent-seeking is here referring to the
inclination of power-holders to non-productively extract surpluses from politically mediated
business opportunities. These include the right to import certain commodities, to produce
certain goods, or to deliver certain services. And when access to certain markets is politically
restricted like this, only the businessmen or companies with the relevant political connections
will get a piece of the cake. Politicians and public officials can then enrich themselves, or
enhance their hold on power, by creating opportunities for direct personal rent extraction and
by ‘selling’ access to rents.
One of the consequences of this is that economic power becomes concentrated. The
presidency controls dealings with private businessmen for their privileged access to
government contracts, licenses, and other deals. A number of companies in Palestine gained
access to PNA-granted monopolies and preferential treatment this way, and the companies
without this access complained that they could not compete with rivals enjoying government
favouritism and subsidies (Rubin 1999:39).
A number of businesses were opened to Palestinians. The negotiations with Israel gave the
Palestinians the right to import certain quotas of goods (like cement and other building
materials, tobacco, flour, meat and fuel), to deliver certain services (like telecommunications
and electricity), and to produce and export certain commodities (like textiles). Many of these
Palestinian rights or quotas were still in the form of sub-contracts for Israeli companies
(because Palestine was not recognised as an independent country), but ever more business
opportunities were created through the negotiations and the ‘peace process’. However, there
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existed numerous restrictions on economic activity, many imposed by Israel, in particular for
residents of East Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip. Underdeveloped infrastructure combined with
all the restrictions held back any economic activity of scale, such as independent banking
(Mazawi & Yogev 1999). In this environment, political connections became even more
fundamental for economic entrepreneurs.
Business opportunities were thus politically mediated, controlled and distributed. Therefore,
the most important political game in Palestine was that of distributing concessions and rights.
Existing businesses and businessmen were positioning themselves by greasing politicians.
The politicians were also manoeuvring for access to rents from PNA ownership of businesses
and by taking over politically generated business opportunities. Some businesses were state
monopolies (PNA owned) like the Petrol Board (that raised money for the PNA by raising
prices higher than in Israel) and the Palestinian Company for Trade Services (cement imports,
a monopoly that enjoys police protection against competitors). Profits earned by these PNA-
approved monopolies were sometimes put into special budget accounts under the president’s
control with no public accounting (Rubin 1999:69). Others were parastatals with PLO/PNA
notables having personal interests in them, and a large number were sub-contractors.
The local chief of the National Guards in Nablus obtained a personal bank loan by using his
institution as collateral. The money was invested in four chicken farms. Dozens of National
Guard members served as workers on these farms. The product was sold to the supplies
department of the National Guard and then landed on the soldiers’ dinner plates. The person
in charge of supplying the local branch with foodstuff was a close relative of the local chief.
As the returns from these transactions went into the chief’s pockets, he came to own several
houses and businesses in the West Bank and Gaza.
Yasser Arafat himself, a number of his closest political friends and allies, a number of
prominent PLO figures, ministers and top-level bureaucrats, and the PLO as such, were
moving into various businesses in Palestine. For instance, the two most prestigious hotels in
Palestine, the Oasis Hotel and Casino in Jericho, and the Grand Park Hotel in Ramallah, were
owned by PLO figureheads, some said by Arafat himself. The Grand Park was frequently
used by state visits, and the Oasis hotel in Jericho was particularly interesting for Israelis and
Jordanians who were forbidden to play games for money in their home countries.
More dangerous were the politically mediated monopolies in core industries handed out to
certain PLO-affiliated private individuals and in particular to the Chairman’s inner circle.
These were the state regulated monopolies or quasi-monopolies in telecommunications, oil
and energy, and several building materials.
An internationally published case involved the Palestinian Telecommunications Company,
Paltel, which enjoyed a monopoly and charged inflated prices. In 1994 an American company
signed a contract with the Palestinian president representing the Palestinian Ministry of Post
and Telecommunications. But in July 1999 a court in the USA ordered that Palestinian
Authority accounts be frozen until it paid $ 20 million in compensation to the US company
for violating their contract and turning over the monopoly rights to Paltel for a period of
twenty years. Allegedly, there were mutual interests between Paltel and some Palestinian
ministries and officials who owned shares in Paltel (Palestine Report, 19 January 2000).
There were several other examples of top politicians interfering in business for private gains.
One case involved the Minister of Civil Affairs, who requested the Israeli side for the closure
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of the Allenby Bridge, the border crossing to Jordan, in order not to allow the import of
cement for a certain period of time. This action was intended to allow the minister's son to
monopolise the cement market through his Al-Karmel Cement Company. Another case
involved the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation, which allegedly spent 92%
of its budget on training and consultant work to hire a consultant firm called Teem, which was
owned by the minister himself. And so on…
4.5 A culture of loyalty
A traditional political culture persisted among many segments of the Palestinian population,
where loyalty was given to local headmen, religious, family- and clan-leaders. In this setting
deference to the traditional leaders was encouraged, more than to a modern organisation with
a rule of ideology or principles. However, the traditional Palestinian elites were declining, and
the remaining traditional hierarchies and patronage relations were fragile. The social basis of
Palestine was nevertheless rather conducive to a clientelist mode of rule, because of the
fragmentation of the population in a predominantly rural setting, with a large migrant
community. In addition to the social and institutional fragmentation of territorial Palestine,
two more factors were conducive to political clientelism. One was that there were large
Palestinian communities in Israel and Jordan, and smaller communities in Lebanon, Syria and
other countries. These had conflicting interests and a fragmented social and organisational
base. The PLO/PNA structure was consequently the nucleus of an extremely dispersed and
heterogeneous population. Secondly, the PLO was in itself partly a product of the attempt of
various Arab presidents and monarchs to withstand Israeli expansion, and not simply a grass-
roots organisation. It had furthermore two deep internal cleavages - one between the
“insiders” and “outsiders”, another one between Gaza and the West Bank.
There existed a considerable rift between returnees (of whom nearly all are Fatah members)
and originally local residents, as both were competing for power and influence. In this
context, both sides had created stereotype images of each other. Locals perceived returnees as
corrupt. The returnees on the other hand saw locals as rigid, backward and inexperienced.
Both sides perceived each other as less loyal to the national cause than themselves. In some of
the distributed leaflets referred to above, returnees were described as robbers of public money
or as violators of the ethical codes of the Palestinian society. From the other side, local
residents were frequently labelled as traitors and as collaborators with Israel.
Returnees were perceived as holding the lion’s share of power and influence, as they
generally occupied the higher positions. While constituting only a small minority of the entire
population, they were holding a quarter of the posts on the Board of Ministers, a quarter of the
posts of deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers, and a large number of the posts of
directors and general directors in the various institutions and agencies. While administrative
work was assigned mostly to returnees, manual work was more likely to be assigned to locals.
Often the heads of the police departments and local chiefs of the National Guard in most West
Bank towns were returnees from Gaza. Examples were the governor of Nablus who was a
member of the Council of Palestinian National Security, while the mayor of Nablus was a
member of the Executive Committee of the PLO. Arafat appointed these two men to maintain
a balance between the two factions of Fatah, the returnees and the locals. As a returnee, the
governor belonged to a group that had little respect for the local Fatah figures. In an private
conversation the governor revealed that he still remembered the day when the PLO – through
Abu Jihad – approved the liquidation of the then minister of civil affairs for collaborating with
Israel.
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While Chairman Arafat was never personally accused of corruption, he seemed to have
condoned it among the people he chose for public office. During the first few months after the
formation of the PNA in 1994, tens of thousands of dollars worth in gifts were given to high
officials in the PNA, especially in the security forces. This money was never registered and
was privately spent by the individuals. In a private meeting a Canadian official mentioned that
the head of he PLC had received $ 3 million in foreign aid and deposited it in his private bank
account. Some of these people have been known to be corrupt for so many years that in a
normal situation they would be a burden to the ruler. This reveals that to the Palestinian
president loyalty came before good conduct and allegiance before accountability.
The director of the Palestinian Police Force issued orders to the police directors in the various
regions to build new headquarters and to secure the funds from sources other than the official
budget of the police. Local police directors were urged to secure the needed money by any
means and were threatened that those who did not succeed would be replaced along with their
assistants. Thus, police directors resorted to illegal dealings that included car robberies, the
obtaining of cash money from spare parts car shops, the confiscation of properties,
overcharging people by raising fees, and money extraction from individuals accused of
felonies in return for their release. In the leaflets the Director of the Palestinian Police Force
was accused of running a ‘jail business’ accusing people of felonies and then blackmailing
them. He was also accused of protecting big drug agents7. Another leaflet accused the director
of the Palestinian Police Force of running a prostitution ring, naming the women involved in
it.
In the Nablus municipality, there was no accountability and oversight. Neither the Ministry of
Local Governance, nor the Ministry of Finance checked on the financial dealings or watched
over the spending of the money provided by donors and other foreign agencies. The Nablus
municipality received large amounts of donor money. Due to the lack of accountability, the
mayor was able to allocate some of this money to strengthen his influence and to expand his
web of supporters in town. He gave monthly salaries to selected individuals and armed a
small militia that received orders only from him. In the words of a member of this group, ‘our
task is to stand firm against any violators of public order and against those who wish to
weaken the patriotic resolve of Nablus’.
Nablus was unique among the Palestinian cities, as it had a highly efficient police force of its
own, in addition to the National Police Force (Gaza also had its own but less efficient police
force). The head of this local police force was indebted to the mayor, since he was reinstalled
to his position after he had been fired for illegal business transactions. He had previously
served as the head of the intelligence division in Nablus, when in 1997 he was fired after
being caught smuggling and dealing with stolen products (personal computers). The general
director of the National Police Force immediately appointed this individual as the director of
the police department in Ramallah, and in 1998 he was brought back to Nablus.
It should be noted here that the mayor of Nablus maintained good ties with prominent national
figures, such as Mahmoud Abbas and the head of the Preventive Security Forces. In a leaflet
distributed during the early second intifada, the three men were accused of preparing to oust
                                                  
7 Supposedly, the scheme worked as follows: big drug agents paid bribes in return for being allowed to continue
with their dealings. The Police Force director arrested the consumers, the drug addicts, confiscated their drugs
and released the offenders for a small ‘fee’. The confiscated drugs were then resold to the dealers.
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the current PLO leadership, working to achieve this with support from Israel and the United
States, after they had disappeared for a month and a half.
‘Ghost workers’ were not unfamiliar in the PNA. The Nablus branch of the National Guard
had 550 names registered as active members, while only 350 were actually on duty. The
remaining 200 names were imaginary, but remained on the payroll. There was the ‘Fatah
Quota’ that consisted of 60 imaginary names, which was usually granted to prominent Fatah
leaders in the area as a bonus to their own salary.
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5 Some Consequences
What kind of state developed in Palestine during the period 1994-2002? The arguments and
stories above indicate a state of the neopatrimonial clientelist kind, captured by unproductive
internal factions. Given the precarious strategic situation and the undefined statehood, the
Palestinian state was rather authoritarian and security-oriented, but too weak to pursue
economic developmentalist policies. It was of the neopatrimonial/clientelist type of state, with
its core characteristics of presidentialism (personalised power) and patrimonial logics (the use
of state resources in order to buy political loyalty), which is quite typical in developing
countries.
Politically, Israel and the Western powers continually stressed security and order over
democracy and social justice in Palestine. Citing the national struggle, the Palestinian political
authority was further monopolised, militarised and personalised by the Palestinian leadership.
A presidency with near dictatorial powers was established, where the mechanisms for popular
and institutionalised control and restraints were seriously underdeveloped.
Despite the authoritarian traits pointing to a strong – and therefore possibly developmentalist
– regime in Palestine, the political and administrative weaknesses of the PNA were apparent.
In the state formation process, the political institutions never came to gain full political
legitimacy and operational capacity. The process of state formation was further restricted and
held back by Israel, and the PNA was partly de-legitimised and critically challenged by a
more fundamentalist opposition. The PNA became increasingly incapable of service delivery.
Not even security and the most basic social services were provided. These unsettled,
precarious conditions gave more prominence to short-term political concerns and military
strategies rather than to long-term development concerns.
Thus, the economic performance of Palestine was relatively poor, like in most clientelist
countries. This was mainly because the state was too weak to push through the economic,
political and social transformations that a genuine and successful development strategy
required. Despite funds from the PLO coffers and substantial foreign economic support, state
resources were appropriated and used politically to secure the necessary internal support and
stability of the PLO-dominated regime.
Basically, rents were created and distributed politically to satisfy three core groups on which
the Palestinian PLO-dominated governing elite depended, namely the security apparatus, the
nominated public officials and bureaucrats, and local strongmen. The constant redistribution
of state resources to these unproductive constituencies was detrimental to the productive
private sector, and might well have led to an endemic fiscal crisis and diminished prospects
for sustained economic development, if allowed to continue.
Now, when the process of state deformation continues and the PNA is pushed back by Israel
through the current reoccupation and marginalisation, some local strongmen will probably
increase their powers at the detriment of centralised and stable rule. In the possible (and
likely) scenario of a complete Israeli reoccupation of Palestine, some local autonomy will
probably be granted to certain larger cities (with the bulk of the Palestinian population), via
‘co-operative’ and ‘friendly’ local strongmen as direct clients of Israel. There is a likelihood,
unfortunately, for a ‘bantustanisation’ of Palestine.
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The state formation process in Palestine started after the Oslo
agreements between Israel and Palestine in 1994, which
established a Palestinian quasi-state. The process came,
however, to an almost complete halt with the onset of the
second intifada in late 2000 and definitely with the Israeli
reoccupation of the West bank and Gaza in 2002. At the time
of writing, Palestine is divided into eight zones, with 120
checkpoints and 220 enclaves, a wall is being built, the
economy is in ruins and the Palestinian administration hardly
operates.
This report argues that despite the authoritarian traits
and strengths of the Palestinian National Authority, which
could have led to a distinct developmentalist state, the same
traits pushed the PNA into corrupt, clientelist practices and
fragmentation.
The obstacles were almost insurmountable. Palestine
had an unsettled international status and an open-ended
conflict with Israel over territories and resources, and an
enclave economy. Some signs were nevertheless very positive.
Initially there was a large degree of national pride and
willingness to make huge sacrifices for the purpose of nation
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However, the clientelist and corrupt practices, together
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democratisation, hampered the process of democratisation
and participation, restricted the institutionalisation of checks
and balances, and opened up for massive criticism and
weakened legitimacy of the regime. Thus, PNA failed in
fulfilling the pressing need for democratic reforms, including
room for participation, institutionalisation and transparency,
in order for the Palestinian Authority to gain more legitimacy
internally and externally.
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